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Public Sector Pay Gap in France: 
New Evidence Using Panel Data
*
 
We estimate the public wage gap in France for the period 1990-2002, both at the mean and 
at different quantiles of the wage distribution, for men and women separately. We account for 
unobserved heterogeneity by using fixed effects estimations on panel data and, departing 
from usual practice, allow the public wage markup to vary over time. We also provide one of 
the very first applications of fixed effects quantile regressions. Contrary to common belief, 
results convey that monetary returns are not fundamentally different in the public sector. 
Firstly, public wage ‘premia’ (for women) or ‘penalties’ (for men) are essentially the result of 
selection. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, only small pay differences between 
sectors remain over time, reflecting fluctuations due to specific public policies and to the pro-
cyclicality of private sector wages. The long-term difference is essentially zero. Secondly, the 
relative compression of the wage distribution by the public sector is also partly due to 
unobserved characteristics. The most natural explanation for these results is that the civil 
sector manages to attract better workers in the lower part of the distribution, in part because 
of non-monetary gains (including job protection), but fails to retain the most productive ones 
at the top. 
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remain ours. 1 Introduction
The size of the public sector poses a daunting challenge for policy makers in France. Public sector
employment represents around a quarter of the total labour force (5.2 million employees in 2006) and
has progressed more rapidly (+24%) than total employment (+13%) over the past 25 years, a reverse
trend compared to most OECD countries. In the same period of time, the weight of the public debt
has increased massively (from 20% to above 60% of GDP). The size of the public wage bill is naturally
seen as one of the main culprits, generating tensions and risks for social cohesion.1 A reduction of public
employment, as announced by recent governments, would require an increase in the e¢ ciency of public
services, if the quality and provision of public goods are to be secured. In this context, economists need
to better understand how the public sector in￿ uences behaviours on the overall labour market, how pay
settlements operate in both public and private sectors and, ultimately, how to maintain the attractiveness
of civil sector careers without creating distortions.
Surprisingly, little is known about the pay di⁄erential between public and private sectors in France.2
This paper aims to ￿ll (some of) the gap by providing an extensive analysis of the public wage gap, i.e.
the wage di⁄erential obtained when controlling for workers￿observed characteristics. For this purpose, we
make comprehensive use of the French Labour Force Surveys for the 1990-2002 period. We ￿rst measure
the public pay gap at the mean (using OLS) and at various points of the conditional distribution (using
quantile regression).3 While most studies assume a constant wage gap, we repeat the exercise for the
di⁄erent years to assess the evolution over time. Results re￿ ect to some extent the cyclical nature of wage
setting in the private sector and the e⁄ect of speci￿c policies on public sector remunerations.
Yet, results based on OLS and quantile regressions are essentially descriptive and must be taken with
caution when it comes to causal interpretations. Indeed, the role of workers￿unobserved characteristics
on both wages and selection in either sector cannot be ignored. Accounting for endogenous selection
may change results regarding the public wage gap, and policy conclusions thereof. It may also give
some indications about the nature and the quality of workers in each sector and at di⁄erent points
of the distribution. The selection issue has been strongly emphasized in the literature based on mean
regression analysis and addressed using instrumental variable methods.4 However, results vary a lot
between countries due to some sensitivity to model speci￿cation or to institutional di⁄erences in the
public sector recruitment process, in wage bargaining and wage structures.5
1The share of public expenditure is well above 50% of GDP in France ￿a situation met only in Nordic countries among
OECD countries. The labour costs of total public employment represent 13.7% of GDP (208 billion euro). The wage bill
for the state alone represents 44% of the total budget (120 billion euro).
2FougŁre and Pouget (2003) focus on the determinants of the sector choice while Fournier (2001) provides a descriptive
comparison of wages in both sectors. Lucifora and Meurs (2006) decompose the wage gap in price and endowment e⁄ects
using quantile regression for France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
3Quantile regressions have been used to study the public wage gap in many countries, starting with Poterba and Rueben
(1995) for the US. Evidence is available for instance for Canada (Mueller 1998), the UK (Disney and Gosling 1998) and
Germany (Melly, 2005). Most studies ￿nd that the public sector compresses the wage distribution and pays a ￿ premium￿to
those at the bottom of the wage distribution for men and to most women except those at the top of the distribution.
4Switching regression models have been traditionally used: a selection equation corrects the wage equations for each
sector and the between-sector di⁄erence in expected wages impacts in turn on the propensity to enter the public sector. For
example, Moulton (1990) analyses public-private earnings di⁄erential for the United States, Van Ophem (1993) and Hartog
and Oosterbeek (1993) for the Netherlands, and Dustmann and van Soest (1998) for Germany.
5It is not clear which instrument should be used to identify public sector participation. These analyses also fail to
account of the possible di⁄erences in the public wage gap at di⁄erent points of the distribution. This is solved by introducing
endogenous selection into quantile regression, as performed by Melly (2006) on German data using the IV-QR estimators
1In this paper, we follow an alternative identi￿cation strategy relying on time variation in individual
wages and public sector histories. The idea is simply to use ￿ ￿xed e⁄ects￿panel regressions of the average
wage gap, as allowed by the (unbalanced) panel dimension of the Labour Force Survey.6 We originally
extend the approach to estimations at di⁄erent points of the wage distribution. This extension is one of
the very ￿rst applications of the ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression estimator suggested by Koenker (2004).7
The main results are as follows. Public sector premia or penalties typically found in the literature are
much smaller when correcting for selection. This result applies to three dimensions: over time, between
groups (gender) and within groups (across quantiles of the wage distribution). Over time, the average
wage gap oscillates around zero with small cyclical variations, consistent with business cycles and speci￿c
policies in favour of public sector wages in the 1990s. In the long run, the wage gap tends toward
zero. On average, men appear to select negatively in the public sector while women select positively.
Di⁄erences between men and women disappear after correction since in both cases, the wage gap is close
to zero. Across quantiles, the usual result that the public sector compresses the wage distribution partly
disappears when controlling for selection. Smaller inequalities in the public sector are due to positive
selection in this sector at the bottom of the distribution and negative selection at the top.
Two policy-related conclusions are drawn from these results. Contrary to common belief, we ￿nd that
public sector workers are not systematically rewarded di⁄erently from their private sector counterparts.
This result is in line with theory, as recalled by Disney (2007), and obtained in the French case even though
movements across sectors are not completely free. That the state does not behave in a fundamentally
di⁄erent way from the private sector and does not generate as much distortions as expected can be seen as
an encouraging ￿nding. Conversely, however, it may signify that the French private sector is itself heavily
constrained by labour market regulation. Secondly, the most likely explanation to the selection-driven
compression is that the public sector attracts higher-quality workers at the bottom of the distribution
thanks to an e¢ cient recruitment policy but fails to retain the best agents at the top of the distribution,
which may be detrimental to e¢ cient management in public administrations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 brie￿ y describes the
institutional setting and the factors that in￿ uence selection and wage settlement in both sectors. Section
4 summarizes the econometric approach, then reports and discusses the results about the evolution of
the public pay gap over time and across quantiles, stressing the impact of endogenous selection. Section
5 draws some policy implications and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
In this study, we make use of the French Labour Force Survey (￿ EnquŒtes Emploi￿ ) collected by the French
National Institute of Statistics (INSEE). Conducted every March on around 60,000 persons, this survey
is a 1/300 representative sample of the French workforce, containing information about education levels,
occupations, wages, region, industry and employment status.
We focus on hourly wages calculated using weekly hours of work during a ￿ normal￿week. As is often
the case, information on work duration is self-reported and subject to measurement errors, especially for
suggested by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) and Abadie et al (2002). The latter estimator is also used to correct quantile
regression estimates of the public wage gap in France in Bargain and Melly (2007).
6See also Disney and Gosling (2007) on British data.
7An application of this estimator to the evaluation of private school vouchers can be found in Lamarche (2006).
2professions with ￿ exible working time (e.g. researchers). Also, work duration may not necessarily re￿ ect
productive e⁄orts: this is a usual limitation for the comparison between sectors. Wages are net of social
contributions and include all bonuses and premium paid to employees in both sectors, as well as the family
supplement (SupplØment familial de traitement) versed to workers in the public sector in complement to
usual family bene￿ts. Yet, monetary measures of speci￿c in-kind advantages, more frequent in the private
sector, may be underestimated. In addition, di⁄erences in pension schemes cannot be rendered in this
analysis.8 Other implicit advantages, and in particular the fact that tenured civil servant have lifetime
job protection, are almost impossible to quantify and a⁄ect workers in an idiosyncratic way according
to their unobserved characteristics (e.g. risk aversion, productivity, etc.).9 Nevertheless, these other
attributes of public sector jobs, and the (expected) net gains from belonging to the civil sector, as viewed
by each individual thereof, are hopefully captured in the treatment of sector selection as suggested in the
sequel.
We restrict the analysis to working individuals aged 20-60 who are not in education and neither
farmers nor self-employed workers. For these two groups, the nature of their income makes it di¢ cult to
compare with salary workers and incomes are subject to important measurement errors. Facing the usual
trade-o⁄ between representativeness of the sample at the population level and the comparability across
sector, we opt in favour of the latter and make further selections for the sake of comparability. We restrict
the sample to those holding a full time contract and exclude trainees and temporary contracts. We also
take out those working in public-owned companies since these ￿rms have been partly privatised over the
last 20 years.10 Finally, we exclude blue-collars workers because they are strongly over-represented in the
private sector (40%) compared to the civil sector (9%), and would make the two distributions much less
comparable both in terms of occupation types and earnings. This last exclusion explains why the share
of public sector workers in the total selection (around 34%) is larger than usual ￿gures (around 23%).
Because of the above selection, we believe we can use interchangeably the terms public sector workers
and civil servants in the sequel.
The selected data is described in Table 1 for the initial and ￿nal years of the period under investigation.
On average, wages are higher in the public (private) sector for women (men). The usual argument that the
state is a less discriminatory employer is partly challenged when controlling for observed and unobserved
characteristics, as found and discussed in the rest of the paper. Women are more represented in the public
sector and there is certainly an important selection e⁄ect, either due to in-kind bene￿ts discussed above
or to gender-speci￿c advantages (more family friendly policies in the public sector). This also is re￿ ected
in the larger average number of children among civil servants. In addition, statistics show that workers in
the public sectors have more experience on average; they have more frequently achieved a general college
or upper university degree while employees in the private sector have opted more often for vocational
education (at the secondary level) or technical degree (after high school). Administrations are well
represented over the whole territory while most of the headquarters of large ￿rms are concentrated in the
Paris region, which explains the reported di⁄erence in location. This potentially explains some di⁄erences
in wages due to the fact that public sector remuneration is geographically uniform while private sector
8Retirement age for public sector depends on the type of job (50, 55 or 60) and is generally lower than in the private
sector (standard age is 65). It has been reformed in the recent years.
9Bellante and Link (1981) show that civil servants are more risk-averse than private sector employees in the US; similar
results are obtained by Bonin et al. (2007) for Germany: a higher willingness to take risks makes an individual more likely
to work in occupations with higher earnings variability.
10Note that several authors, including Disney and Gosling (2003), exploit privatisations as natural experiments to account
for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the public wage gap.
3wages are on average higher in Paris. Finally, Table 1 reports general types of profession. In France, socio-
professional categories are traditionally summarised in four groups: managers (including professors and
￿ higher intellectual professions￿ ), intermediate professions, white-collars workers and blue-collar workers.
With the exclusion of the last group, as previously indicated, the distribution of occupations is reasonably
comparable between the two selected samples.
The Labour Force Survey is a rotating panel: each household remains in the survey for three consec-
utive years with one third of households being replaced each year. We use this feature to construct an
unbalanced longitudinal panel sample, making use of the waves from 1990 to 2002. Importantly for our
￿xed e⁄ects estimations, we ￿nd that in the total 12-year pooled sample, 5% of the workers move from
the public to the private sector while 3% moves in the other direction. Considering the large sample size,
these cross-sector movements allow us to identify the selection e⁄ect.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Selected Samples)
Period 1990 2002 1990 2002
Real hourly wage - women (1) 8.3 9.7 7.9 8.8
Real hourly wage - men (1) 10.0 11.3 10.9 11.7
Weekly work hours 39.2 37.6 40.6 38.4
Age 40.2 43.0 37.8 39.6
Experience (# years) (2) 21.6 23.2 19.4 19.8
Female 0.59 0.62 0.54 0.54
In couple 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.25
# children 1.24 1.09 1.05 1.00
Paris region 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.26
Education:
Secondary education 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.14
Vocational training 0.39 0.31 0.44 0.32
High school 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.21
University first degree (tech.) 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.16
University first degree 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02
University upper degrees 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.16
Occupation:
Managers (3) 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.21
Intermediate professions (4) 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37
White-collars workers (5) 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.42
No of observations 8,236 9,048 13,001 16,899
Proportion of initial sample of employees 53% 57% 45% 47%
(1) Salaries include all bonuses and premium averaged over the year; they are expressed in 2002 euro.
(2) Computed as current age minus age at end of studies
(3) Includes administrative, commercial or technical executives, professors and `higher intellectual professions'
(4) Includes intermediary positions in commercial, technical and administrative sectors, health services, teachers, technicians.
(5) Commercial, technical and administrative employees and clerks
Public Private
3 The Public Sector in France
To better understand the institutional setting, we discuss the selection of workers into the public sector
in France. We also describe how wages are formally settled in both sectors. As developed in the fol-
lowing sections, however, these structural di⁄erences between sectors may not necessarily translate into
substantial di⁄erences in pay levels.
4In France, the main entry in the public sector is through a nationwide competitive examination
process (known as ￿ external exam￿ ). Until 2005 it included some legal age limits ￿between 28 and 45
depending on the type of job ￿so that sector choice occurred at a relatively early stage in one￿ s career.
Nonetheless, pathways to di⁄erent positions in the civil sector also exist (￿ internal exam￿ ), as well as entry
for professionals who previously had a career in the private sector. Leaving the public service is irreversible
in the sense that one loses the bene￿t of passing the ￿ external exam￿ . However, public-to-private sector
crossover is allowed for a certain period of time.
Endogenous selection has been addressed by FougŁre and Pouget (2003) in a switching regression
model adapted to some of the French speci￿cities. Because of age restriction for national examination,
they select a sub-group of young workers and model selection into the public sector as a double hurdle.
Firstly, workers must be willing to attend the competitive exams. The instrument used to identify self-
selection is a question on whether the father was himself a civil servant, in line with sociological results on
the importance of cultural transmission (Audier, 2000). Secondly, the probability of success is explained,
among other things, by education. Minimum levels of education, or speci￿c diploma, are required to be
eligible to di⁄erent positions through the ￿ external exam￿ . Another important aspect is that tenured civil
servants have life job protection while those who do not wish or manage to enter the public sector face a
risk of unemployment. FougŁre and Pouget identify the probability of unemployment by local situations
on the labour market and use it to compute excepted wages in the private sector, thereby a⁄ecting the
expected di⁄erential in potential wages between sectors.
Wage settlements in the French private sector depend on collective negotiations and, contrary to
the public sector, are sensitive to business cycles. In particular, the 1992-1996 period is characterized
by economic slowdown and increased unemployment, which translate into lower negotiation power and
stagnation in real wages for the private sector, as illustrated in Figure 1. Union membership is smaller in
the private sector than in the public sector. For a majority of ￿rms, wage bargaining relied on sector-based
negotiations until the 1980s. Following the introduction of the Auroux Act in 1982, wages were negotiated
at the ￿rm level more than at industry level. Private sector trade unions have disparate objectives and
strategies. It is nonetheless important to stress that the labour market is strongly regulated in France,
as further discussed in the last section.
Wages in the public sector depend on a grid of four general pay scales, distinguishing between man-
agerial positions of responsibility, clerical sta⁄, specialised posts and non-specialised posts (labelled as
categories A, B, C and D). Education levels essentially determine the type of public job and hence the
corresponding scale and the starting wage level. Then, promotions in the public sector are automatic,
with a rigid wage progression depending on age according to o¢ cial salary scales.11 In principle, wages
are centrally negotiated through collective bargaining between social partners, as established in 1983.
They should re￿ ect at minimum changes in the cost of living but are not settled in reference to private
sector pay, as this is the case for instance in the UK. In practice, the level of the multiplier applied to
the pay indices on the single integrated pay structure is still decided unilaterally by governments (and
the outcome of the bargaining process is not legally binding for the government, cf. Guillotin and Meurs,
1999). Public pay levels thus re￿ ect mostly policy orientations, public budgetary conditions and, to a
lesser extent, political business cycles. In particular, public sector wages have been ￿ frozen￿in real terms
during the period 1982-1988 characterized by ￿scal rigor (not represented). To compensate for the loss in
purchasing power and to catch up on private sector wages, public sector remuneration has been boosted
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Figure 1: Progression of Hourly Wages (2002 constant euro) in Private and Public Sectors
by the ￿ reformes categorielles￿of Durafour, Jospin and Lang in periods 1988-1995 and 1997-2000. The
e⁄ect of these reforms can be seen on the evolution of the median in Figure 1.12
For the 10%, 50% and 90% percentiles, Figure 2 plots the raw di⁄erentials between public and private
sector wages that result from trends in both sectors. There is a clear positive gap in favour of the
public (private) sector for women (men) throughout the period, with the exception of those at the top
(bottom) of the wage distribution. Also, it appears that boosts in public wages in the early 1990s,
combined with stagnant wages in the private sector, have indeed allowed public remuneration to increase
compared to private wages (for both men and women). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, however,
the positive e⁄ect of the economic upturn on private sector wages has dominated and the raw gap has
thereby decreased. Overall, the counter-cyclicality of the wage di⁄erential seems to re￿ ect primarily the
sensitivity of private sector wage (and the lack of sensitivity of the public sector) to macro shocks. In
what follows, we investigate to which extent these results ￿both di⁄erences between gender and shifts
in the wage gap over time ￿are due to genuine price e⁄ects or to di⁄erences in workers￿observed and
unobserved characteristics across sectors.
4 Estimations of the Public Wage Gap
4.1 Econometric Approach
Estimates of the public wage gap with exogenous selection are obtained using standard OLS and quantile
regressions for each year data. To account for unobserved characteristics that possibly a⁄ect both wages
and selection, we use ￿xed e⁄ects estimations of the public wage gap on the (unbalanced) panel data.
Below, we ￿rst summarize this approach then provide an intuitive explanation for the identi￿cation of a
time-varying wage premium. Lastly, we extend the ￿xed e⁄ects approach to quantile regression.
12The trend for the mean, not represented, is very similar. For average values: (initially lower) wages in the public sector
increase by 8% in real terms in the ￿rst half of the 1990s while wages in the private sector are almost stagnant (+1%). The













































































































Figure 2: Raw Wage Di⁄erential
Consider the classical linear panel data model:
yi;t = ￿i + xi;t￿ + "i;t; i = 1;:::N; t = 1;:::T
where ￿i is time-invariant heterogeneity among workers (the individual ￿xed e⁄ect) and xi;t is a vector
of explanatory variables including a public sector dummy and a set of controls.13 The ￿ parameter
corresponding to the public sector dummy is the public wage premium (positive or negative) that we
report in the results of the next section. Let us write the model in matrix form as:
y = ￿Z + X￿ + ":
The ￿xed e⁄ects model makes no assumption about the dependence of ￿i and xi;t such that the vector
of the individual ￿xed e⁄ects must be (explicitly or implicitly) estimated. If we are willing to assume








(yi ￿ ￿i ￿ xi;t￿)2:
Of course, this dummy variable regression approach results in so many explanatory variables (more
than 50,000 regressors in our application) that it is not possible to estimate the model using standard







13In all estimation techniques described here, we use the following controls: experience, experience square, dummies for
education levels (see Table 1), number of children, presence of children of age 0-3, lone parent, French nationality obtained
by naturalization. Regions cannot be used with ￿xed e⁄ects models since panel information is collected for those staying
at the same location over the three years. The complete set of results from the estimations is available upon request to the
authors.
7This is the traditional ￿xed e⁄ects estimator implemented as a pooled OLS regression on time-demeaned
data.
The ￿xed e⁄ects estimation of a time-varying wage gap is simply obtained by interacting the public
sector dummy with year dummies. The intuition for the identi￿cation result is best illustrated with a
simple two-period model where the only relevant variable is the public sector dummy S. We assume that
yi;t = ￿i + ￿t + Si;t￿t + "i;t for i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;2
where E ["i;t j￿i;Si;t] = 0 for i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;2. The parameters of interest are ￿1 and ￿2. We
also assume that, with a strictly positive probability, some individuals move from the public sector to the
private sector between period 1 and period 2 and others move in the opposite direction during the same
period. Asymptotically, we can observe:
E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 0;Si;2 = 0] = ￿2 ￿ ￿1
E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 1;Si;2 = 1] = ￿2 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ ￿1
E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 0;Si;2 = 1] = ￿2 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2
E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 1;Si;2 = 0] = ￿2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1:
It follows that, if we subtract the last line from the ￿rst one, we obtain:
E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 0;Si;2 = 0] ￿ E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 1;Si;2 = 0] = ￿1
and if we subtract the ￿rst line from the third one, we get:
E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 0;Si;2 = 1] ￿ E [yi;2 ￿ yi;t jSi;1 = 0;Si;2 = 0] = ￿2.
Thus, the public sector premia are identi￿ed for both periods. An equivalent result can be obtained by
using the second line (the population always in the public sector) as a reference instead of the ￿rst one
(the population always in the private sector). Identi￿cation on the population of ￿ movers￿is standard
but we nonetheless discuss possible limitations in the conclusion.
Finally, we consider the analogous quantile regression model of the form:14
F￿1
y (￿ j X;Z) = ￿Z + X￿(￿) for ￿ 2 [0;1]:
Note that the ￿￿ s have a pure location shift e⁄ect on the conditional quantiles of the response. It is
impossible to estimate distributional shift for each individual because we do not observe an individual
in more than three waves. However, the e⁄ects of the covariates (especially of the public sector dummy)










wq￿￿q(yi ￿ ￿i ￿ xi;t￿(￿q)) (1)
where ￿￿(u) = u(￿ ￿ 1(u < 0)) denotes the quantile loss function. The weights control the in￿ uence of
the Q quantiles on the estimation of the ￿xed e⁄ects. In the application we simply use Tukey￿ s trimean
weights: wq = 0:5 ￿ jq ￿ 0:5j:
14The following approach and the presentation of the ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression estimator draw heavily Koenker
(2004).
8As noted above, the dimensions of this problem are extremely large (N > 50;000 and T = 12).
For quantile regression, we must deal with the full problem because time-demeaning the data is not
allowed and would change the estimand. Fortunately, the design matrix has a very sparse structure:
the extremely large majority of the elements of the matrix are equal to 0. Koenker and Ng (2005) have
written an algorithm for quantile regression exploiting the sparsity of the design matrix. We have used
this algorithm to estimate the coe¢ cients of interest in our application.15
4.2 Evolution of the Mean Public Wage Gap
Figure 3 ￿rst shows that using repeated OLS for each year (exogenous sector choice), men appear to be
underpaid in the public sector while women are overpaid, a rather classic result in this literature. When
compared to the raw wage di⁄erential between sectors, the trend is unchanged but the overall level of the
public pay gap is slightly lower, both for men and women. This shows that salary workers in the public
sector have slightly better characteristics than their counterparts in the private sector, contributing to
increase (reduce) the apparent premium (penalty) for women (men). Also, the null hypothesis that the
mean public premium is constant is strongly rejected. Figure 3 actually shows that the premium increases
until the mid-1990s then stabilizes before declining by the end the decade. These trends are similar for
men and women and relatively similar to those obtained for the raw di⁄erential.16
Yet, it is not sure that these premium and penalties, even after controlling for observed heterogeneity,
are due to genuine price di⁄erences between sectors. We therefore control for endogenous selection using
￿xed e⁄ects estimations as previously described. Interestingly, the wage gap is considerably lower for
women and higher for men in this case (cf. Figure 3). It turns out that on average, men select negatively
into the public sector while women select positively. The average public wage gap obtained after correction
is very similar for men and women at all years and close to zero. The remaining premia and penalties
correspond to small oscillations around zero and re￿ ect the speci￿c public policies aimed at boosting
public remunerations in the early 1990s and the pro-cyclicality of private wages. For men, the wage gap
is signi￿cantly negative in 1992 and positive in 1994-1999; for women, it is signi￿cantly negative in 1991-
1992 and positive in 1994-2000. When estimations are carried out on pooled data holding the premium
constant over time, traditional ￿xed e⁄ects estimations also show that for both men and women, the
premium is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. In other words, the average premium over time is null.
15We are interested in the results for ￿ = 0:01; 0:02;:::0:99: Because of computational di¢ culties (near singularity of
the design matrix), we could not estimate (1) for these 99 quantiles simultaneously. We have therefore used the following
strategy: (i) estimation of the vector ￿ by solving (1) for ￿q = 0:25;0:50;0:75, (ii) estimation of the remaining quantiles
based on the vector b ￿ obtained from step (i). As a robustness check, di⁄erent quantiles were used in step (i) but no
noticeable change could be observed. Codes written in R (and Stata for the preparation of the data) are available from the
authors.
16As discussed in Disney (2007), pay di⁄erences may be due to di⁄erent occupational structures between sectors and
di⁄erent evolutions of the occupation mix over the period. Yet, controlling for occupation types in the regressions does not
seem to change the time trend plotted in Figure 3 (contrary to what is found by Disney and Gosling, 1998, in the case
of the UK) nor the level of the average premium for women (contrary to Poterba and Rueben, 1994, for the US). This is
likely due to initial sample selection ￿exclusion of blue collar, part-time and temporary workers ￿aimed at making the two
groups comparable, as discussed above. For men, however, the overall trend is shifted upward (the penalty is reduced) when
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Figure 3: Evolution of the Average Public Sector Premium: OLS versus Fixed E⁄ects
4.3 Evolution of the Quantiles of the Public Wage Gap
Figure 4 plots the public wage mark-up at di⁄erent points of the wage distribution, as obtained using
quantile regression on pooled data. It shows a premium for women (except at the top) and a penalty
for men (except at the bottom). In both cases, the public pay gap decreases with the wage level. This
relative compression of the wage distribution in the public sector is a rather usual result. It is often
justi￿ed by the fact that governments are less competitively-driven than the private sector and more
inclined to equity and fairness in wage settlements, which translates into higher earnings than market
levels at the bottom and moderate remuneration to top civil servants.
This view is challenged by results of the ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression on pooled data (holding the
premium constant over time), as reported in Figure 4. The compression result partly disappears after
correction.17 For instance, the 10%-90% percentile di⁄erence is ￿ve times lower when we control for
endogeneity (and only a small premium at the very bottom and a small penalty at the very top see to
remain). This means that an important part of the observed compression is actually due to selection.
Policy implications of this result are potentially very important and discussed in the sequel.
Next, we allow the public wage gap to vary over time by estimating separate quantile regressions for
each year (assuming exogenous selection) as well as ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression on the whole panel
(endogenous selection). These two sets of estimations are the analogue of results in the previous sub-
section for the (time-varying) average premium using OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿rst result is a similar
shift to that obtained for the mean ￿upward for men and downward for women ￿for all quantiles. That
is, premia and penalties decrease at all points of the wage distribution. While the di⁄erence in pay gap
17Interestingly, this ￿nding is con￿rmed by Bargain and Melly (2007) when using a di⁄erent strategy to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Precisely, we apply the IV-QR technique suggested by Abadie et al. (2001) and use whether
the father was himself a civil servant or not as the instrument. The latter captures the transmission of civil sector status
documented by sociologists (Audier, 2000).
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Figure 4: Public Sector Premium across Quantiles (quantile regressions on pooled data)
between the 10% and the 90% percentiles oscillated over time in a narrow range 0.08 ￿0.12 (in terms of
log hourly wage) for women and 0.12 ￿0.16 for men, this di⁄erence is considerably reduced when using
￿xed e⁄ects (0.02 ￿0.04 for women and 0.03 ￿0.05 for men). That is, the compression e⁄ect partly
disappears for all years in the data when controlling for selection.
The time-varying pay gap at 10%, 50% and 90% percentiles is represented in Figure 5 for all years.
We can see the (small) remaining di⁄erence in the gap between top and bottom quantiles. The level of
the median is very similar to that obtained for the mean and the trend is identical, with ￿ uctuations
around zero in a narrow interval (roughly between -0.02 and +0.03 in terms of log hourly wage). A
similar trend is also observed for the extreme quantiles, conveying in particular that political decisions in
favour of public sector wages in the early 1990s (or bene￿ts from the economic upturn in the late 1990s)
have reached all quantiles relatively evenly.
Table 2 summarizes all the previous results and provides standard errors, as obtained by bootstrapping
all results 100 times. Note that we have bootstrapped the individuals so that standard errors are robust
against clustering at the individual levels.
5 Interpretations and Policy Implications
In this last section, we provide a tentative interpretation of the results and some policy implications.
The ￿rst general question is whether we should expect a ￿ public sector wage e⁄ect￿or not. Disney and
Gosling (1998) and Disney (2007) discuss several possible explanations for the observed di⁄erences in pay
between sectors. In particular, the omission of characteristics that explain pay di⁄erences, as for instance
a larger in￿ uence of trade unions in the public sector, is often invoked. While we do not test speci￿cally
for this possibility here, more representative unions in the public sector could indeed explain the wage
premium for women. There is no obvious reason, however, why things should be di⁄erent for men in























































































































Figure 5: Evolution of the Public Wage Gap at di⁄erent Quantiles (￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression)
this regard. Another line of argument concerns the potential existence of compensating di⁄erentials,
i.e. in-kind advantages and fringe bene￿ts that would o⁄set pay di⁄erences. As explained previously,
however, this type of gain is to be found mostly in the public sector, where employees bene￿t from job
protection and more advantageous pension plans. Therefore, the explanation may be valid for men, who
face wage penalties in the public sector, but not for women. Other structural di⁄erences, due for instance
to fundamentally di⁄erent occupational compositions between sectors, have been netted out through
additional control variables, as previously discussed.
While these interpretations militate for the existence of signi￿cant pay di⁄erences between sectors,
the alternative explanation provided in this paper is that these apparent disparities essentially arise from
di⁄erences in workers￿unobserved characteristics. For both men and women, the di⁄erence between
sectors is centred around zero when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, contrary to a net premium
for women and some penalties for men otherwise. Some di⁄erences remain but seem to be mainly cyclical,
with for instance a small public sector premium in the mid-1990s, as discussed above. This residual gap
is therefore the result of intrinsic di⁄erences in wage settlements (public sector wage policies versus
sensitivity to macro shocks in the private sector). It may also re￿ ect the fact that individuals are not
totally free to move between sectors, as explained in the second section. However, in the long run, the
gap tends to disappear for both men and women.18
That the civil sector is not responsible for large distortion on the labour market, contrary to what
is usually thought, is a rather interesting or reassuring ￿nding for policy makers. Yet, it may signify,
on the contrary, that distortions on the private sector in France are just as large as in the civil sector.
Indeed, private sector wages are directly or indirectly in￿ uenced by interventions like minimum wage,
18Focusing on men in the UK, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) show that the public wage premium tends to zero over the
life-cycle and that wage compression in this sector also disappears when considering lifetime values.
12work duration, unemployment bene￿ts and strict job protection measures. In particular, the minimum
wage necessarily limits the public-private di⁄erential for low-skill workers.19
The identi￿cation of unobserved heterogeneity on the population of ￿ movers￿may lead to the interpre-
tation that some genuine pay di⁄erentials exist between sectors and are precisely the reason for movement
across sectors. We believe, on the contrary, that selection is a complex process that depends only partly
on (supposedly) wage di⁄erences between sectors.20 In turn, wage di⁄erentials are to some extent the
result of the allocation of heterogenous workers in one or the other sector. An important point is the
fundamental asymmetry that characterizes the French system: opting for a career in the private sector is
entirely based on self-selection while entering the civil sector is the outcome of self-selection and success
at the entry examination. Then a possible interpretation of the results is as follows. Those who form the
lower end of the distribution in the public sector are those who selected positively in this sector (maybe
due to higher risk aversion) but who have also succeeded in entry examination and are likely to have
higher unobserved skills than workers at the same rank in the private sector wage distribution.21 At the
top of the wage distribution, agents with the highest wage potential (and possibly lower risk aversion)
have self-selected in the private sector.
Policy implications can be drawn from these results. Positive selection in the public sector and the
subsequent premium at the bottom of the wage distribution convey that the system of entry examination
functions well and allows the recruitment of higher-skilled workers than in the private sector. Yet, negative
selection at the top, i.e. the fact that the state does not retain the most skilled agents, is a problem. In
the extreme case, skill shortage could appear at the top of the public sector hierarchy and be detrimental
to the overall quality of public services.22 This pleads in favour of performance-based mechanisms to
secure e¢ cient management in the administration.23
19Lucifora and Meurs (2006) emphasize the fact that the public sector pay gap is smaller in countries where pay deter-
mination is more regulated (like France or Italy) compared to countries where market factors play a larger role (like Great
Britain), and this particularly in the lower part of the wage distribution.
20Indeed, as argued in the third section, many non-monetary di⁄erences (e.g. job protection) can shape individual
incentives to go in one or the other sector. Selection thus depends on this complex set of implicit costs and bene￿ts, and
from individual-speci￿c perceptions of the di⁄erences between sectors (e.g. the attractiveness of a protected job in the civil
sector depends on the individual unemployment risk, and hence the expected wage in the private sector, and on individual
risk aversion, among other things).
21Several ￿ndings tend to con￿rm these views. Pouget (2005) shows that low educated workers obtain higher earnings in
the public sector. Focusing on a cohort of young workers, FougŁre and Pouget (2003) ￿nd that, all observable characteristics
being equal, workers with the lowest wages in the private sector are also those who have the highest unemployment
probabilities. Inversely, public sector entry examinations seem to select those who, among all candidates, would have higher
wage potential in the private sector. FougŁre and Pouget provide additional evidence on the excess supply of workers
wishing to enter public sector employment in France. They also ￿nd that the recruitment process selects better candidates
in years of high unemployment. As a matter of fact, Figure 5 shows that for years of economic downturn (early 1990s), the
wage di⁄erence between quantiles is smaller, especially between the 10% percentile and the median.
22A substantial (20%) and increasing proportion of those graduating from the (elite) administration school, ENA, actually
work in the private sector.
23Burgess and Ratto (2003) review international evidence and ￿nd that explicit incentives, and especially Performance
Review Pay, are typically under-used in the public sector. Also, potential di⁄erences in ￿nancial incentives between public
and private sector managers is often thought to be compensated by a non-pecuniary bene￿t for the public employees,
e.g. meeting their altruistic goals, as document in the sociological or administrative literature. In Rainey and Steinbauer
(1999), for instance, public service motivation is perceived as being a "general, altruistic motivation to serve the interests
of a community of people, a state, a nation, or humankind...". This aspect has been very important in France, with a
Napoleonic state tradition of non-monetary rewards in the public sector based on vocation and a culture of public service.
Yet, relying on intrinsic motivation to achieve higher e¢ ciency in the provision of public good does not seem to be su¢ cient
anymore. However, attempts to incentivise public sector pay may have to be designed in ways that do not con￿ict with
13A similar argument as above applies to explain the large positive premium for women. This premium
is essentially due to selection, meaning that the public sector attracts more quali￿ed women thanks to
incentives that are not necessarily linked to pay di⁄erential between sectors (e.g. more pay discrimination
in the private sector). More likely, jobs in the protected sector are more highly valued by women due to
the fact that they face much higher risks of unemployment than men in the private sector. Additional
factors may also come into play, like other in-kind advantages (more family friendly work arrangements in
the public sector) and gender-speci￿c characteristics (e.g. higher risk aversion, as documented by Bonin
et al., 2007).24
6 Conclusion
We estimate the public wage gap in France over 1990-2002. We use (unbalanced) panel data to estimate
￿xed e⁄ects regression models for the mean and at di⁄erent quantiles of the wage distribution. We thus
capture the role of unobserved characteristics a⁄ecting both wage determination and sector selection.
The main results are as follows. Firstly, men select negatively in the public sector while women select
positively. When correcting for endogenous selection, the average public wage gap is very similar for men
and women, that is, very close to zero. In other words, the standard result that the public sector o⁄ers
pay premia and does so especially for women is essentially the result of unobserved characteristics. In
the short-run, residual premia (for women) and penalties (for men) re￿ ect speci￿c pay policies ￿aimed to
boost public remunerations in the early 1990s after a period of ￿scal rigor and wage stagnation ￿and the
pro-cyclicality of private sector wages. The long-run pay di⁄erential is close to zero, a result shared with
recent studies (Disney and Gosling, 2007, Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2007). Secondly, quantile regression
estimates show that the relative compression of the wage distribution by the public sector is partly due
to the selection e⁄ect. Important policy implications were drawn from these results.
Some limitations to the econometric approach used in this paper are discussed in the text. In addition,
we make two ￿nal remarks. Firstly, there may be some limitations in using movements across sectors.
As previously discussed, most of the shifts toward the public sector may have occurred in early years
of career due to age limits on national entry examinations. To the extent that unobserved factors that
in￿ uence selection (e.g. risk aversion) are fairly constant, relying on a relatively age-speci￿c group may
not be such an impediment. Movements in the other direction are less of a problem. Secondly, we
have estimated models simply using a dummy variable for the public sector to capture potential ￿ public
sector wage e⁄ect￿ . Such models may be seen as misspeci￿ed. While it is well-known that, in case of
misspeci￿cation, least square regression provides a minimum mean squared error linear approximation to
the true functions, Angrist et al. (2006) provide a similar result for quantile regression. Our ￿ndings have
therefore meaningful interpretation even if the true public sector wage premium depends on the covariates.
Nonetheless, it would be interesting to examine the heterogeneity of the premium by interacting it to
workers￿characteristics. In particular, this would bring more insights on whether controlling for selection
reduces between-group wage compression (other than gender) in addition to within-group compression.
We keep this for future research.
vocations (see Disney, 2007).
24Di⁄erences between gender are found in other countries. For the UK, Nickel and Quintini (2002) ￿nd that the decrease
in public sector wages is related to a decline in the ￿ quality￿of the public sector workforce but that this e⁄ect concerns only
men.
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16Table 2: Estimates of the Public Sector Premium
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Pooled regression -0.069 0.002 -0.072 0.003 -0.182 0.005 -0.090 0.003 0.082 0.002 0.094 0.002 -0.146 0.004 -0.086 0.003
Fixed effects 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.034 0.002 -0.011 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.025 0.002 -0.005 0.001
Separate regression assuming exogenous sector choice
1991 -0.102 0.007 -0.105 0.008 -0.135 0.017 -0.064 0.010 0.036 0.005 0.043 0.006 -0.122 0.014 -0.054 0.009
1992 -0.093 0.007 -0.089 0.007 -0.167 0.015 -0.066 0.010 0.041 0.006 0.053 0.007 -0.102 0.012 -0.056 0.008
1993 -0.070 0.006 -0.070 0.007 -0.182 0.014 -0.066 0.010 0.075 0.005 0.087 0.006 -0.097 0.014 -0.056 0.008
1994 -0.059 0.006 -0.054 0.007 -0.164 0.016 -0.073 0.009 0.097 0.006 0.106 0.007 -0.124 0.010 -0.066 0.008
1995 -0.032 0.006 -0.034 0.007 -0.175 0.014 -0.083 0.008 0.120 0.006 0.134 0.007 -0.130 0.010 -0.064 0.007
1996 -0.030 0.006 -0.039 0.007 -0.174 0.015 -0.086 0.009 0.115 0.005 0.130 0.006 -0.105 0.012 -0.048 0.009
1997 -0.030 0.006 -0.033 0.007 -0.167 0.014 -0.086 0.009 0.118 0.005 0.130 0.006 -0.103 0.011 -0.062 0.008
1998 -0.029 0.007 -0.034 0.008 -0.175 0.014 -0.080 0.011 0.119 0.005 0.132 0.006 -0.108 0.010 -0.065 0.008
1999 -0.026 0.006 -0.033 0.007 -0.169 0.014 -0.086 0.009 0.112 0.005 0.125 0.006 -0.099 0.011 -0.057 0.008
2000 -0.041 0.006 -0.047 0.007 -0.146 0.016 -0.087 0.011 0.111 0.005 0.114 0.006 -0.112 0.011 -0.059 0.007
2001 -0.071 0.006 -0.076 0.007 -0.139 0.015 -0.071 0.011 0.091 0.005 0.087 0.007 -0.108 0.011 -0.056 0.007
2002 -0.048 0.006 -0.051 0.009 -0.126 0.017 -0.047 0.009 0.099 0.005 0.094 0.007 -0.116 0.014 -0.051 0.009
Fixed effects (allowing for endogenous sector choice)
1991 -0.007 0.006 -0.007 0.004 -0.037 0.010 -0.021 0.006 -0.012 0.004 -0.009 0.003 -0.037 0.007 -0.013 0.004
1992 -0.018 0.006 -0.013 0.004 -0.029 0.010 -0.004 0.005 -0.015 0.004 -0.010 0.003 -0.034 0.007 -0.006 0.003
1993 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.041 0.008 -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.031 0.006 -0.002 0.003
1994 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.004 -0.042 0.007 -0.011 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.003 -0.028 0.006 -0.003 0.003
1995 0.028 0.006 0.025 0.004 -0.055 0.007 -0.012 0.004 0.026 0.003 0.020 0.003 -0.028 0.007 0.000 0.003
1996 0.028 0.006 0.027 0.005 -0.045 0.007 -0.017 0.005 0.032 0.004 0.027 0.003 -0.031 0.005 -0.003 0.002
1997 0.033 0.007 0.023 0.006 -0.051 0.008 -0.015 0.005 0.033 0.004 0.026 0.004 -0.029 0.005 -0.008 0.003
1998 0.025 0.007 0.019 0.006 -0.051 0.008 -0.016 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.018 0.004 -0.031 0.005 -0.007 0.002
1999 0.019 0.007 0.017 0.006 -0.041 0.008 -0.012 0.005 0.021 0.005 0.020 0.004 -0.037 0.006 -0.009 0.003
2000 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.006 -0.056 0.007 -0.028 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.004 -0.044 0.005 -0.026 0.003
2001 -0.010 0.008 -0.012 0.006 -0.053 0.008 -0.018 0.005 -0.010 0.006 -0.012 0.005 -0.041 0.005 -0.013 0.004
2002 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.007 -0.043 0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.005 -0.030 0.007 -0.003 0.006
90-10 75-25
Notes: Results show the public sector premium (coefficient and standard error) at the mean and median, the difference between 90% and 10% percentiles and the difference between 75% and 25% percentiles.
Variables controlled for in the regressions are: experience, experience square, dummies for education levels, number of children, presence of children of age 0-3, lone parent, French nationality obtained by
naturalization. Standard errors are estimated by bootstrap on a large number of replications.
Men Women
Mean Median 90-10 75-25 Mean Median
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